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ABSTRACT 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE 
Çakır, Nida 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı 
September 2006 
In this thesis, the effects of fiscal procedures, fiscal centralization and fiscal 
decentralization, on fiscal discipline are analyzed in a theoretical framework. A 
model of two optimization problems is established: central government’s 
optimization problem and local government’s optimization problem representing 
the two fiscal procedures; fiscal centralization and fiscal decentralization 
respectively. Comparative static analysis is performed, and moreover ambiguous 
results are calibrated. Our results indicate that in fiscal decentralization fiscal 
discipline increases with the number of localities. Furthermore, the portion that goes 
to the pool of the central government has a positive effect on the size of 
redistribution in fiscal centralization, but it has a negative effect in fiscal 
 ii
decentralization. Similarly, whereas income tax rate affects the size of redistribution 
positively in fiscal centralization, it has a negative effect in fiscal decentralization. 
Keywords: Fiscal Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline  
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ÖZET 
MALİ YERELLEŞME VE MALİ DİSİPLİN 
Çakır, Nida  
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı 
Eylül 2006 
Bu tezde, mali usullerin, mali yerelleşme ve merkezileşme, mali disiplin üzerine 
etkileri teorik bir çerçevede incelenmiştir. Mali yerelleşme ve merkezileşmeyi 
sırasıyla temsil eden yerel hükümet eniyileme ve merkezi hükümet eniyileme 
problemlerini içeren bir model kurulmuştur. Karşılaştırmalı statik yapılmış ve 
ayrıca belirsiz sonuçlar kalibre edilmiştir. Sonuçlara göre, mali yerelleşmede, yerel 
hükümetlerin sayısı arttıkça mali disiplin artmıştır. Buna ilaveten, merkezi 
hükümetin havuzuna giden oran arttıkça, mali merkezileşmede toplam transfer 
miktarı artarken, mali yerelleşmede toplam transfer miktarı oran artışıyla azalmıştır. 
Benzer şekilde, mali merkezileşmede gelir vergisi oranı toplam transferler üzerinde 
pozitif bir etki yaratırken, mali yerelleşmede bu oran toplam transferler üzerinde 
negatif bir etki yaratmıştır.      
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Mali Yerelleşme, Mali Disiplin 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
                  Government deficits are a matter of concern in most of the countries, 
developing or developed, for which reducing budget deficits by means of achieving 
fiscal discipline is an important phenomenon. Accordingly, in recent years, a 
growing number of countries around the world have increased efforts to improve on 
fiscal organizations, where fiscal decentralization (FD) is one aspect of these 
organizations.  
                  Main issues that fiscal organizations or arrangements take into account 
are as follows:  
i. How should the central and local government relationships be established? 
ii. Does the transfer system create negative incentives for localities to collect 
taxes? 
iii. How should intergovernmental transfers be structured so as to ensure fiscal 
discipline? 
 2 
It can be deducted from the above questions that the structure of transfer systems is 
crucial, and the decisions of governments should be in such a way that they are able 
to reduce fiscal indiscipline, and income disparities. 
                  An important aspect of fiscal arrangements, fiscal decentralization refers 
to devolution of revenue sources and expenditure functions to lower tiers of 
government. Accountability and transparency in government actions, streamlining 
public sector activities and encouraging the development of local democratic 
traditions (De Mello, 2000) carry important implications for the success of FD. 
Since the main goal of FD is to achieve lower budget deficits, the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on fiscal discipline is important. 
                  There is a growing recent theoretical literature on fiscal arrangements 
and fiscal discipline, as well as optimal equalization grants. For instance, Von 
Hagen and Harden (1995) examine decision making procedures and fiscal 
discipline in a game theoretical framework. They take into consideration the 
budgeting procedures within the central government concerning the collective 
interest of the government and individual interest of spending ministers (SMs), and 
conclude that procedure oriented approach, that is the decision of SMs, leads to 
lower fiscal discipline.  
 3 
                  Neyaptı (2006, forthcoming) addresses fiscal discipline via fiscal 
decentralization by means of extending the model of Von Hagen and Harden (1995) 
such that the effects of monetary discipline on budgetary outcomes can be 
examined. Unlike Von Hagen and Harden (1995) would predict, Neyaptı shows 
that, due to the addition of central bank independence feature into the model, one 
can obtain the result that as the number of SMs increases, total spending and 
deficits may decrease. Moreover, the higher the utility obtained from SMs’ 
individual spending, the higher are the spending biases and budget deficits.   
                  In an analysis of the effects of different intergovernmental regimes on 
fiscal discipline, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) argue that fiscal indiscipline 
results from the optimization problem of the locality under incomplete information.                  
Slightly different from the above studies, Dahlby and Wilson (1994) focus on 
equalization grants in the context of optimal tax theory. Optimal equalization grants 
are formulated so as to distribute the tax burden across localities, and the authors 
conclude that when the share of total expenditures of a locality exceeds the share of 
total capacity, it is a recipient of grant.   
                  This study offers a theoretical framework where we focus on the effects 
of fiscal procedures, i.e. fiscal decentralization and centralization, on fiscal 
 4 
discipline1. In a way, we compare the fiscal procedures with regards to fiscal 
discipline. In doing this we also address the issue of equalization, where we 
construct the fiscal procedures of fiscal centralization and fiscal decentralization as 
the optimization problems of the central government and local government, 
respectively. The set up of our model includes a redistribution mechanism that 
depends on the tax effort and the deviation of the actual income from the target 
income of a locality. Moreover, fiscal discipline is measured via tax efforts 
resulting from the optimization problems. Hence, while focusing mainly on fiscal 
discipline by means of fiscal procedures; we address equalization and total 
transfers, i.e. size of redistribution, under a redistribution mechanism. The 
equalization concept here is referred to as the setting of target incomes across 
localities at the same level. 
                  Different from the mentioned literature, fiscal procedures described in 
the current model, which yields the optimal tax effort and optimal transfers, are 
constrained by a redistribution mechanism which includes a measure of fiscal 
discipline as well as equalization. While maximizing the welfare of the society, a 
block mechanism preventing overspending of jurisdictions is formed. As a result, 
                                                 
1
 Fiscal discipline is taken as aggregate tax effort.  
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our study focuses on the issues i to iii mentioned above. Main findings of our 
analysis are as follows: 
i. In fiscal decentralization procedure, the number of localities is positively 
associated with fiscal discipline. 
ii. In the procedure of fiscal decentralization, an increase in the deviation of 
actual output from its target creates a disincentive for a locality to 
increase its tax effort due to increase in transfers via this deviation of 
income. 
iii. In the procedure of fiscal decentralization, the portion that goes to the 
pool of the central government has a negative effect on the size of 
redistribution, however in fiscal centralization a positive effect is 
observed.  
iv. The income tax rate has a positive effect on the size of redistribution in 
fiscal centralization, but in fiscal decentralization it affects the size of 
redistribution negatively.  
                  The remaining part of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
presents a literature survey on fiscal arrangements and fiscal discipline as well as 
equalization. Chapter 3 presents our model and solutions of our optimization 
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problems. Chapter 4 provides comparative static analysis. Chapter 5 submits the 
calibrated results obtained in the chapters 3 and 4. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
                  Provision of economic efficiency and macroeconomic stability are 
among the main concerns of the governments. In this context, fiscal arrangements 
are crucial. The range of fiscal activities subject to such fiscal organizations 
includes the decisions on taxes, intergovernmental transfers, and debt financing, all 
of which have attracted a good deal of attention in the literature. Fiscal 
decentralization is one aspect of fiscal arrangement that the literature has widely 
focused on.  
                  Many empirical studies have recently examined the advantages and or 
the pitfalls of fiscal decentralization. De Mello (2000) states that local governments 
meet local preferences and needs better than national governments. Since local 
 8 
governments are much closer to the people and so more identified with local causes, 
information on the local preferences and needs costs cheaper reducing transaction 
costs. Hence, fiscal decentralization (FD) is expected to boost public sector 
efficiency, accountability, and transparency. But, on the other hand, De Mello 
(2000) also emphasizes that fiscal relations is a crucial and rather complex issue in 
decentralization, and failures in coordination of intergovernmental relations can 
result in a deficit bias, especially in the case of developing countries. It has been 
expressed that possible higher coordination and information costs to jurisdictions 
may prevent the realization of benefits of decentralization, and hence expenditure 
decentralization may worsen the situation.   
                  Fiscal decentralization has two aspects: expenditure and revenue-
collection decentralization of the governments. Decentralization of spending may 
increase economic efficiency which may imply lower deficits, but an increase in 
deficits is also possible. Within this frame, Neyaptı (2006) analyzes the relationship 
between budget deficits and fiscal decentralization using panel data techniques. 
Whereas expenditure decentralization is observed to be significant for deficits, 
revenue decentralization is not. The analysis focuses on various factors that are 
suggested to affect the relationship between FD and deficits by the literature. The 
 9 
factors are as follows: the size of the government, business cycles, governance, size 
of the country, the presence of local elections, and the extent of ethno linguistic 
fractionalization. 
                  Related to the factors that are analyzed by Neyaptı (2006), Davoodi 
(1998) shows the negative impact of FD on growth for developing countries based 
on the argument that the efficiency gains from FD may not materialize for 
developing countries since revenue collection and expenditure decisions by local 
governments may still be constrained by the central government.2 Similarly, Zou 
and Jin (2002) examine the effects of decentralization on government size. They 
conclude that expenditure decentralization leads to larger aggregate and sub 
national governments. However, revenue decentralization leads to larger sub 
national governments but it reduces national government’s size by more than it 
increases sub national governments’ sizes, and hence leads to a smaller aggregate 
government size.  
                  There are also theoretical studies inspecting the structure of procedures 
for choices of the federal government and its jurisdictions, and the structure of 
transfer systems. Within this context, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) analyze the 
                                                 
2
 Neyaptı (2006) expresses that growth, which stands for business cycles, also affects deficits.   
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effects of different regimes of intergovernmental transfers on fiscal discipline and 
welfare. Analogous to our model, the model of Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) 
enables us to observe whether certain institutional arrangements weaken fiscal 
discipline or not. Furthermore, the paper determines the level of transfers in 
different institutional settings, and different from us, the authors consider the role of 
transfers on smoothing shocks to local incomes. Federal transfers are used as a risk 
sharing mechanism, and they finance expenditures of localities via stochastic 
income by the federal government. In the paper, in one regime, local income in each 
region is realized by the federal government, and via the optimization problem the 
federal government precommits to a certain level of transfers (called as the first best 
case). The set up is similar to the central government’s optimization problem in our 
model. While transfers compensate for both horizontal and vertical imbalances in 
Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004), transfers compensate only for horizontal 
imbalances in our case and there is no ex-ante insurance. In our set up, central 
government does not collect taxes, localities collect taxes and a portion of the 
collection goes to the pool of the central government.  
                  Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) study also incomplete information with 
two cases: commitment and Nash. In the commitment case, federal government 
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commits to a certain level of transfers knowing just the distribution of shocks, not 
the realization. In the latter, each locality maximizes its utility similar to the local 
government’s optimization problem in our model. They conclude that transfers and 
private consumption are higher than the first best case. Hence, incomplete 
information yields excessive sub-national spending. In this context, the effort 
related compensation mechanism which works as a punishment mechanism in the 
redistribution rule of transfers in our model may be considered as a block 
mechanism that prevents overspending. 
                  Another important finding, which is also related to our analysis, of 
Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) is that in the Nash solution too little tax effort is 
observed when the resources of the federal government are not fixed and 
distortionary taxation is considered. Similarly, in our set up, under same income 
targets across two localities, the local government’s optimization problem yields 
lower total tax efforts than that of the central government implying lower fiscal 
discipline.   
                  Dahlby and Wilson (1994) also elaborate equalization grants but in the 
framework of optimal tax theory. As in Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004), they 
minimize the social cost of providing government services, which is equivalent to 
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maximizing the welfare of the society, where they relate equalization grants to tax 
effort and fiscal capacity. A similar relation is invigilated in our analysis that 
focuses on the distribution of tax burden across localities, where the grants are 
made. Even though the distribution of transfers according to a rule maximizing the 
welfare of the society is an analogous concept, we do not study optimal taxation. 
Differently, we focus on the fiscal procedures (centralization versus 
decentralization), where the decision of optimal tax effort that maximizes the 
welfare is made by the locality.  
                  In Dahlby and Wilson (1994), an optimal equalization grant formula is 
examined which has expenditure and fiscal capacity mechanisms, and the 
equalization payments sum up to zero. This implies that the federal government 
takes from one locality and gives it to the other. Our redistribution rule of transfers 
similarly includes tax effort and income compensation mechanisms; however, all 
the collection is allocated back to the jurisdictions, so that they do not sum up to 
zero. Moreover, Dahlby and Wilson (1994) construct the formula such that if the 
share of total expenditures of a locality exceeds the share of total fiscal capacity, it 
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is a recipient of grant; which can be sighted in our analysis as we compensate a 
locality for lower actual income than the target income3.  
                  While Dahlby and Wilson (1994) focus on how the tax burden in a 
federation should be distributed across jurisdictions so that equalization of the 
social marginal cost of raising revenue across localities via optimal grants is 
satisfied, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) focus on different fiscal regimes of 
intergovernmental transfers and fiscal discipline. We, on the other hand, present a 
model that unify some aspects of both Sanguinetti & Tommasi (2004) and Dahlby 
& Wilson (1994) such that we elaborate both different fiscal procedures and 
optimal grants in a framework that allows us to address fiscal decentralization and 
fiscal discipline, as well as equalization.  
                   Similar to Sanguinetti & Tommasi (2004), Von Hagen and Harden 
(1995) analyze how decision making procedures can be used as devices for fiscal 
discipline and affect fiscal performance of a government. The authors analyze fiscal 
discipline under a different set up, however. They consider the budgeting 
procedures within the central government describing different fiscal procedures 
concerning the collective interest of the government and individual interest of 
                                                 
3
 Another equalization grant mechanism based on population is also considered by the authors. But, 
this does not yield optimal values and it is deducted that the resulting grants may reduce welfare.  
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spending ministers (SMs). Moreover, the paper focuses on fiscal illusion that is 
described as the overestimation of the marginal benefit of a public activity. The 
optimization problem of the government yields smaller optimal budget than the 
resulting budget of the SMs’ optimization problem implying a spending bias due to 
fiscal illusion. Lower spending bias can be interpreted as ensuring fiscal discipline. 
Within this context, we can conclude that fiscal decentralization results in fiscal 
indiscipline in Von Hagen and Harden (1995), which is parallel to our finding 
considering FD and fiscal discipline under equalization in a slightly different 
model. Similarly, Sanguinetti & Tommasi (2004) concludes that, under incomplete 
information, excessive sub national spending is observed. But, additionally, Von 
Hagen and Harden (1995) examine the case where SMs negotiate over the 
allocations, and a smaller optimal budget is obtained. So, they conclude that 
bargaining reduces the spending bias; which is equalization that reduces fiscal 
indiscipline in fiscal decentralization of our analysis. As a result, Von Hagen and 
Harden (1995) state that strengthening the collective interest the government can 
reduce the spending bias, which could be achieved via vesting the ministers without 
portfolio with special strategic powers. Modeling this approach indicates that when 
the ministers without portfolio have little strategic power, the optimal budget gets 
 15
closer to the bargaining optimal budget of the SMs. However, when they have full 
strategic power, the collective optimal budget is reached. Hence, the paper observes 
a positive relation between spending bias and the relative strength of SMs’ 
individual incentives against collective interest of the government.  
                  A unifying theme of Von Hagen & Harden (1995) and Neyaptı (2006) is 
fiscal discipline which is addressed via budgeting procedures in the former and 
fiscal decentralization in the latter. Moreover, Neyaptı (2006, forthcoming) extends 
the model of Von Hagen & Harden (1995) such that the effects of not only fiscal 
discipline but also monetary discipline on budgetary outcomes can be inspected. 
Neyaptı (2006, forthcoming) incorporates central bank independence (CBI) as a 
measure of monetary discipline and a budget constraint into the model of Von 
Hagen & Harden (1995). Different from Von Hagen & Harden (1995), deficits are 
financed through money issue inversely related with the degree of CBI and through 
bond issue, and all monetary expansion is inflationary. Moreover, model predictions 
are tested empirically for 12 OECD countries during the 1980s. The results support 
the model results. The results are such that if the central bank is totally independent, 
all SMs’ spending are on target and inflation is zero. Otherwise, there is a negative 
relationship between the deviations of spending and inflation from their respective 
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targets. When the central bank is not totally independent, Nash bargaining solution 
leads to lower spending bias than the individual optimization of SMs. 
                  Consistent with Von Hagen & Harden (1995), Neyaptı (2006, 
forthcoming) observes that the government’s collective interest yields lower budget 
deficits, and lower inflation rates than the SMs’ individual and Nash bargaining 
solutions. She also states that the lack of monetary discipline increases fiscal 
discipline on the part of spending ministers, since the model imposes that they 
internalize the cost of their spending. Hence, as the number of the SMs ( n ) 
increases, the government may cut back on total spending and deficits due to the 
expectation that both total spending and inflation would increase. Two other 
important findings of Neyaptı (2006, forthcoming) are as follows: the first is that as 
n  increases, the spending bias that arises from Nash bargaining solution increases 
as compared to that of the government’s collective interest. That is, increase in the 
number of localities leads to lower fiscal discipline in the Nash bargaining case than 
the government’s collective interest. The second is that the higher the utility 
received from individual SMs’ spending, the higher are the spending biases and 
budget deficits, implying lower fiscal discipline. Even though, we can not do a 
comparison between our procedures with respect to a change in n , in our model, as 
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the number of localities increases, higher fiscal discipline is provided under fiscal 
decentralization. Contrary to the second finding, calibration analysis of fiscal 
decentralization procedure concludes that the higher the utility obtained from 
government expenditures the higher the fiscal discipline.  
                  Neyaptı (2005) examines fiscal decentralization under a different set up 
from the above theoretical studies. Like Dahlby and Wilson (1994), the paper 
focuses on equalization but, in the frame of fiscal decentralization using regression 
analysis considering the provinces of Turkey. In the paper, in addition to the main 
concerns for FD, main issues that affect the success of FD are mentioned. It is 
stated that equality, macroeconomic stability, and economic efficiency are among 
the main issues of FD. Eliminating vertical imbalances along with reducing 
horizontal imbalances is the “equalization” concept of the paper. Moreover, the 
paper realizes equalization feature as a disciplining device in case of FD. Our model 
considers equalization as an additional crucial issue to be analyzed along with the 
fiscal procedure of decentralization, while focusing mainly on the provision of 
fiscal discipline. Similar to Dahlby and Wilson (1994) and our study, the paper 
proposes a redistribution method for Turkey based on the measures of vertical and 
horizontal imbalances across the jurisdictions, where our redistribution mechanism 
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only considers horizontal imbalances based on a theoretical set up. As also told by 
Dahlby and Wilson (1994), Neyaptı (2005) states that focusing only on a population 
based system of distribution of the revenue pool is not meaningful. An egalitarian 
redistribution system can be better. Then, she concludes that the better the 
macroeconomic performance, the larger the municipal revenues, and the better the 
socio-economic status, the larger the municipal spending. In addition, the paper 
deducts that a reasonable system of redistribution should be based on socio-
economic characteristics.  
                  In summary, fiscal decentralization has important implications for 
economic efficiency. While FD can be promoted due to provision of more identified 
local causes and cheaper costs of information on the local preferences and needs, it 
can also lead to excessive sub national spending, high budget deficits, lower tax 
efforts, and so lower fiscal discipline. Hence, exploring the design of fiscal 
decentralization along with its impact on fiscal discipline and equalization still 
remains to be an important issue.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MODEL 
 
                  Consider an economy where there are n local governments and a central 
government. Governments’ main objective is to maximize the welfare of the 
society. The central government (CG) collects taxes from each locality. “c” 
proportion, where 0 1c< < , of all collected taxes goes to the pool of the central 
government, all of which is then allocated back to the regions as transfers. 
Moreover, we assume that only local governments undertake government spending 
in a locality and CG has no spending.  
                 Local governments (LGs) collect effective income taxes and make 
expenditures that are financed by part of the tax collection that does not go to the 
pool of the CG (c portion of the tax collection goes to the pool) plus the transfers. 
Allocation of transfers to each locality is based on a redistribution rule which is 
composed of a punishment mechanism and an income compensation mechanism. 
The punishment mechanism depends on the deviation of tax effort of the locality 
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from the target value “1”, and the income compensation mechanism refers to the 
transfers compensation based on the deviation of actual output of the locality from 
its target output. In our model, the deviations of actual output of the localities from 
their target output indicate horizontal imbalances. As this deviation increases, 
imbalance grows. Hence, to be able to compensate the imbalance, transfers should 
rise. Therefore, one part of the redistribution rule works as an income compensation 
mechanism. So, the tax effort of the locality and the deviation of actual output from 
the target are crucial for the transfers a locality receives. 
                  We are going to analyze two fiscal procedures represented by the central 
government’s and the local governments’ optimization problems4. CG decides on 
the level of transfers allocated to each locality while maximizing the overall welfare 
of the society subject to the collection constraint. The optimization problem of CG 
is referred to as “fiscal centralization”. On the other hand, LG maximizes the 
welfare of its jurisdiction subject to the redistribution rule and decides on the level 
of its tax effort. We refer to LG’s optimization as “fiscal decentralization”. 
                  Tax effort level is important in analyzing fiscal discipline. We 
characterize “fiscal discipline” in each problem as the total of tax efforts across the 
                                                 
4
 We also studied the problems when either CG or LG is the leader. Because of the set ups of the CG 
and LG problems (and their constraints), the leader problems do not give meaningful results. So, 
only the two main problems (CG and LG) are analyzed in this paper.    
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local governments. Furthermore, the optimal level of total transfers is characterized 
as “the size of redistribution” in each problem. The main objective of studying 
these two procedures is to be able to answer the question: “Does fiscal 
decentralization cause more fiscal discipline?”. Hence, we aim to evaluate the two 
different fiscal procedures (CG and LG problems that represent fiscal centralization 
and decentralization respectively) on the basis of fiscal discipline they lead to; that 
is we compare the two problems vis a vis both fiscal discipline and also the size of 
redistribution. Therefore, the evaluation of our results depends on total tax efforts 
and total transfers implied by the two problems. Based on these results, comparative 
static analyses are utilized in the next chapter for studying the effects of the main 
parameters of the model on fiscal discipline and the size of redistribution.  
                  In the following section, first we describe the common expressions and 
variables of the two problems. Then, we study the problems and solutions 
separately in sections 3.2 and 3.3.   
3.1 Variables and Description of the Model 
                  We assume that there are n localities which are indexed by i=1, 2,…, n.  
 22
                  The effective tax rate of the Central Government is defined as i it tA=  
where t  is the exogenous common income tax rate and iA  is the tax effort of the i
th
 
locality, where 0 1t< <  and  0 1iA< ≤ 5 .             
                  ( , )i i iY f K L=  is the per capita production of locality i (actual output), 
which is exogenous with given ,i iK L  per capita capital and per capita labor 
amounts for each locality6. 
                  i i iT t Y=  is the effective income tax of region i. 
                  
1
n
i
i
c T
=
∑  is the total revenue of the Central Government, where c is the 
proportion of effective local taxes that is given to CG7.  
                  
*
iY is the exogenously determined target level of output of locality i. 
                                                 
5
 Distribution depends on local governments’ tax efforts and the deviation of actual output from 
target output. To avoid from corner solution (zero tax effort) in the LG problem and to create a 
redistribution mechanism, we limit the level of tax efforts as 0 1iA< ≤  where “1” is the target 
value. 
6
 All variables are in per capita terms.  
7
 
1 1
0
n n
i i i
i i
c T ct AY
= =
= >∑ ∑  
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                  (1 ) (1 )i i i i i i iC Y T t Y tA Y= − = − = −  is the private consumption which is 
the after tax income, where we assume 1iC > . It is therefore observed that iC  is a 
decreasing function of iA .  
                  Local government expenditures are composed of transfers received from 
the central government ( )iTR  and the part of the effective income tax revenue that 
does not go to the pool of the central government. That is, (1 )i i i iG TR c t Y= + −  is 
the government expenditure of the ith locality. We also assume that 1iG > 8.  
                  It can be observed that the market clearance condition is satisfied for the 
CG problem:   
1 1
( )
n n
i i i
i i
Y C G
= =
= +∑ ∑ . It is, however not the case for the LG problem, 
since i i iY C G= +  does not necessarily hold so long as  i i iTR ctAY≠ , meaning that 
transfers are not necessarily equal to locality’s contribution to the common pool  
                  Transfers are distributed according to the following redistribution 
mechanism that has both a punishment and a compensation components to achieve 
discipline and income equality: 
                                                 
8
 In the following section, we construct the problems such that the governments get utility from 
private consumption and government expenditures, where the utility is a concave function of iC  and  
iG . Within this frame, to have well defined problems the specified assumptions, iC >1 and iG >1, 
are made. 
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*( ) ( )i i i iTR k t t m Y Y= − + −  (3.1) 
 
where k  is the “punishment parameter” or the effort related compensation 
parameter ( 0k > , a policy variable), and m is the “income compensation 
parameter” or the weight on the income compensation, where 0 1m< < . The first 
part of the rule, ( 1)ikt A − , works as a punishment mechanism such that the lower 
the tax effort of the ith locality the lower the transfer given to it. Therefore, transfers 
are designed to generate incentives for localities to provide tax effort, since they are 
given according to provided tax effort. On the other hand, the second part, 
*( )i im Y Y− , works as an income compensation mechanism such that the lower the 
deviation of actual output of the ith locality from target, the lower the transfers it 
receives so that equality across regions can be reached9. Hence, the central 
                                                 
9
 In our model the target output of the ith locality is indicated by *iY and it is exogenous.  
If * *iY Y= for all i, the income compensation mechanism turns out to be an “equalization 
mechanism”. That is, setting all the targets at the same level is “equalization”.   
Alternatively, the target output can be defined as * ( , )i i iY g K L= and *i i iY Y ε= + , where iε is a 
random shock. We may also consider a production function that is the same for all localities, but 
there are different endowments and different shocks. If  *
1
( ) 0
n
i i
i
Y Y
=
 
− > 
 
∑ , then  
1
0
n
i
i
ε
=
 
< 
 
∑  
is obtained. This means that a locality can receive transfers in case of negative shocks, like the 
“income compensation” mechanism.  
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government’s transfers are used for both income compensation and provision of 
fiscal discipline. From (3.1) one can observe that a locality can receive zero 
transfers when iA  is “1” and income is on target. Furthermore, the rule works 
completely as a punishment mechanism for a locality having a high level of output 
as compared to the target even if full tax effort (“1”) is provided. This is due to the 
fact that *i iY Y−  decreases as iY  increases, and CG can compensate the horizontal 
imbalances by means of transfers when the actual output of the locality is less than 
the target.  
                  For both problems, preferences are defined over private consumption 
and government expenditures. The problems are discussed in detail in the following 
sections, 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.2 Local Government’s Problem10 
               The utility function of the ith locality is defined as 
ln lni i iU C Gα β= +  (3.2) 
                                                                                                                                        
We also consider the case where *iY Y= , but it causes the income compensation part of the 
redistribution rule to disappear and the size of the redistribution to be non positive which contradicts 
with our model set up. 
 
10
 We study the problem of Local Government for an arbitrary locality because the problem is same 
for other localities. 
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where iU  is concave and increasing in both iC  and iG , and
2
0i
i i
U
G C
∂ ≥
∂ ∂
. 
Moreover, 
iU  satisfies the Inada conditions. That is, 0limi
i
C
i
U
C→
∂
= ∞
∂
 and
0
lim
i
i
G
i
U
G→
∂
= ∞
∂
.  
               (3.2) shows that a locality gets utility from private consumption and 
government expenditures in proportions of α , 0 1α< < , and β , 0 1β< < , 
respectively11.  
                  The optimization problem of LG is defined as the maximization of the 
welfare of the locality subject to the redistribution mechanism:  
iA
maximize    ln lni i iU C Gα β= +
 (3.3) 
*
    ( 1) ( )i i i isubject to TR kt A m Y Y= − + −    (3.1) 
 To solve the problem, we first replace iC  by (1 )i it Y−  and iG  by (1 )i i iTR c t Y+ −  
in (3.3), which yields: 
*
max  ln((1- ) ) ln( (1 ) )
.  ( 1) ( )
i
i i i i iA
i i i i
tA Y TR c tAY
s to TR kt A m Y Y
α β+ + −
= − + −
 
                                                 
11
 In the following calibrations, we use the standard form of Cobb Douglas function such that 
1α β+ = . 
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As can be observed, if transfers increases, government expenditures increases 
which in turn increases the utility.  
                  Now, to convert the problem into an unconstrained optimization 
problem, we insert (3.1) into the objective function. Then, we have 
*max  ( ln((1- ) ) ln( ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ))
i
i i i i i i i iA
V tA Y kt A m Y Y c tAYα β= + − + − + −       (3.4) 
                  Our solution to this problem should satisfy the first order and second 
order optimality conditions. The first order condition of the problem is  
*( ln((1- ) ) ln( ( 1) ( ) (1 ) )) 0i i i i i i i
i
tA Y kt A m Y Y c tAY
A
α β∂ + − + − + −
=
∂
   (3.5)   
and it results in     
*( ( ))
( )( (1 ) ) ( )
o i i
i
i
kt m Y YA
t k c Y t
α β
α β α β
− −
= +
+ + − +
 (3.6) 
               
o
iA  characterizes the optimal iA  obtained as the solution of the problem if 
it also satisfies the second order optimality condition. The second order optimality 
condition is described as  
2
2 0
i
i
V
A
∂
≤
∂
  at oiA . 
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2 2 * 2
( (1 ) )
(1 ) ( ( 1) (1 ) ( ))
i i
i i i i i i i
V kt c tYt
A tA kt A c tAY m Y Y
βα∂ + −
= − −
∂ − − + − + −
        (3.7) 
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When we evaluate (3.7) at oiA , we have the following: 
2 2 3
* 2
( (1 ) ) ( ) 0( ( 1) ( 1) )
i
i i
t k c Y
k t c m Y mY
α β
αβ
+ − +
− ≤
− + + − −
. 
Hence, the second order optimality condition is also satisfied. Therefore, oiA  is the 
optimal tax effort for the LG problem12. 
                  From (3.6), we obtain the total optimal tax efforts of the LGs as:    
*
1 1
( ( ))
( )( (1 ) ) ( )
n n
o i i
i
i i i
kt m Y YA
t k c Y t
α β
α β α β= =
 − −
= + 
+ + − + 
∑ ∑        (3.8) 
which is the expression for fiscal discipline in fiscal decentralization. Given (3.1), 
we also observe that  
*
1 1
( ( 1) ( ))
n n
i i i i
i i
TR kt A m Y Y
= =
= − + −∑ ∑  (3.9) 
               Inserting (3.6) into (3.9) results in 
*
*
1 1 1
( )( ) (1 )
n n n
i i
i i i
i i i i
kt m Y YkTR TR m Y Y nk t
k c Y
α β
α β α β= = =
 − −  
= = − + + −   + + − +  
∑ ∑ ∑ (3.10
)                                  Therefore, (3.10) is the optimal size of redistribution for the 
LG problem. 
                                                 
12
 See appendix for details about nonzero optimal solution. 
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3.3 Central Government’s Problem 
                  The utility function of CG ( )U is defined as the sum of the utilities of all 
regions:  
1 1
( ln ln )
n n
i i i
i i
U U C Gα β
= =
= = +∑ ∑  (3.11) 
 The optimization problem of CG is  
                            i 1TR
max imize ( ln ln )
 
n
i i
i
C Gα β
=
+∑
                (3.12) 
subject to
1 1
  ( )
n n
i i i
i i
TR ctAY
= =
=∑ ∑  (3.13) 
The problem specifies that overall welfare of the society is to be maximized while 
all the taxes collected, 
1
(
n
i i
i
ctAY
=
∑ ) >0, are distributed back to regions as transfers.  
                  Now, we proceed with the solution of the problem. The Lagrangean 
function is: 
1 1 1
( ln ln ) (  )
n n n
i i i i i
i i i
L C G ctAY TRα β λ
= = =
= + + −∑ ∑ ∑  
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where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier. The value of the Lagrange multiplier at the 
solution of the problem is equal to the rate of change in the maximal value of the 
objective function as the constraint is relaxed. As in LG problem we replace iC  by 
(1 )i it Y−  and iG  by (1 )i i iTR c t Y+ − , and obtain the first order conditions as: 
0(1 )i i i i
L
TR TR c tAY
β λ∂ = − =
∂ + −  (3.14) 
1 1
 0
n n
i i i
i i
L
ctAY TRλ = =
∂
= − =
∂ ∑ ∑
 (3.15) 
                  Combining (3.14) and (3.15) yields: 
1
(1 )
n
o
i i i i i
i
tTR AY c tAY
n =
 
= − − 
 
∑  (3.16) 
                  (3.16) should also satisfy the second order necessary conditions to be the 
optimal solution to the CG problem.  
                  To examine the 2nd order necessary conditions, we are going to check 
the rank of 
1 1
0
i
n n
TR i i i
i i
TR ctAY
= =
 ∂ − = 
 
∑ ∑ , and second order derivative of the 
Lagrangean of the CG problem with respect to iTR  at 
o
iTR . 
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( )
1 1
0 1 1
i
n n
TR i i i
i i
Rank TR ctAY Rank
= =
  ∂ − = = =  
  
∑ ∑ . Moreover, 
( )2 2 0((1 ) )iTR i i iL c t Y TR
β−∂ = <
− +
  at  oiTR . Hence, the rank equals to the number 
of constraints and second order derivative of the Lagrangean function is negative 
implying that the second order optimality condition is met. Therefore, (3.16) is the 
optimal solution to the CG problem. According to (3.16), one can observe that 
transfer distribution of the central government depends basically on the tax effort 
and actual income of jurisdiction. Moreover, the total size of redistribution of the 
problem is given by: 
1 1 1 1
(1 )
n n n n
i i i i i i i
i i i i
tTR TR AY c tAY ct AY
n= = = =
  
= = − − =  
  
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
                  In the next chapter, we do comparative static analysis for iA , iTR , and 
TR  arising from both problems with respect to main parameters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS 
 
                  In order to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
fiscal discipline we need to perform comparative static analysis. To this end, we are 
going to study partial derivatives of the size of redistribution, optimal level of 
transfers and tax effort with respect to: 
*
,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ( )i ic k m t n Y Yα β −  
for both the CG and the LG problems. In addition, we will inspect how transfers 
change with respect to a change in the tax effort. We think that this analysis will 
enable us to make judgements about the effectiveness of different fiscal procedures, 
where effectiveness is with respect to fiscal discipline and the elimination of 
horizontal imbalances. 
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4.1 Comparative Statics for LG problem 
                  The effects of the specified variables on the optimal tax efforts and the 
size of redistribution are analyzed in the following subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 
respectively. 
                 4.1.2 Partial Derivatives for Optimal Tax Effort 
                 We use the expression that we have obtained in the LG problem:  
*( ( ))
     (3.6)( )( (1 ) ) ( )
i i
i
i
kt m Y YA
t k c Y t
α β
α β α β
− −
= +
+ + − +
   i=1,.., n. 
whose partial derivative with respect to the portion of taxes (c) that goes to the pool 
of the central government is: 
*
2
(( ( )) ( ) )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i i i
i i i i
A Y Y kt m Y Y k Y cY
c t k Y cY t k Y cY
β α β
α β α β
∂ + − + + −
= − +
∂ + − + + − +
      (4.1) 
The sign of (4.1) cannot be determined. In cases of ambiguous signs, we utilize 
calibration analysis as will be reported in the next chapter.  
                  Equation (4.2) shows how tax effort responds to a change in the effort 
related compensation parameter: 
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*
2
( ( )) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i
i i i i
A kt m Y Y k Y cYt
k t k Y cY t k Y cY
α βα β
α β α β
∂ + − + + −+
= −
∂ + − + + − +
               (4.2) 
If *( ) 0i iY Y− > , tax effort increases with the effort related compensation. 
According to the redistribution rule, income compensation increases the transfers 
received. This creates an incentive for a locality to increase its tax effort via effort 
related compensation.  
               The partial with respect to the income compensation parameter yields: 
*( )
( )( )
i i i
i i
A Y Y
m t k Y cY
α
α β
∂ −
=
∂ + + −
 (4.3) 
According to (4.3), if actual output is higher than the target, as the rate of income 
related compensation increases tax effort of locality i increases. That is, 0iA
m
∂
>
∂
. 
One explanation is that, TR will decrease if *i iY Y> . So, to be able to compensate 
this decrease in transfers, local government should increase its tax effort. On the 
other hand, if actual output is lower than the target, as m increases tax effort 
decreases. That is, TR will increase if  *i iY Y<  (income compensation mechanism). 
So, there will be no need to increase iA  for the locality to increase transfers. 
Therefore, high TR may create a disincentive for tax effort.  
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                  The effect of common income tax rate on tax effort is given by: 
*
2
( ( )) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
i i i i i
i i i i
A kt m Y Y k Y cYk
t t k Y cY t k Y cY
α βα
α β α β
∂ + − + + −
= −
∂ + − + + − +                (4.4) 
Similarly, we are not able to observe the sign of (4.4). Calibration will tell us the 
sign. 
                  As the deviation of the actual income from its target increases, tax effort 
of the ith locality decreases: 
*( ) ( )( )
i
i i i i
A m
Y Y t k Y cY
α
α β
∂
= −
∂ − + − +
 (4.5) 
This is due to increasing transfers via the increase in *( )i iY Y− , which creates a 
disincentive for the locality to increase its tax effort.  
                  The effect of the proportion of private consumption in utility on tax 
effort is also ambiguous: 
* *
2
( ) ( ( )) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
i i i i i i i
i i i i
A kt m Y Y kt m Y Y k Y cY
t k Y cY t k Y cY
α β
α α β α β
∂ + − + − + + −
= −
∂ + − + + − +
    (4.6) 
                  Similar to the above, the effect of the utility proportion of government 
expenditure on tax effort is ambiguous:  
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*
2
( ( )) ( )1
( ) ( )( )
i i i i i
i i
A kt m Y Y k Y cY
t t k Y cY
α β
β α β α β
∂ + − + + −
= −
∂ + + − +
            (4.7) 
Calibration will show us the sign of these effects. 
                  As we can observe from (3.6), we are not able to examine the effect of 
the number of jurisdictions on the optimal tax effort. However, we can observe the 
effect of n  on fiscal discipline,  1 0(
n
i
i
A
n t
β
α + β)
=
 ∂  
 
= >
∑
. Hence, the following 
proposition arises: 
                  Proposition 1: The number of the local governments has a positive 
effect on fiscal discipline.  
                  A locality should provide tax effort to get transfers from the central 
government. Hence, an increase in number of localities may result in an increase in 
total tax efforts.  
                  4.1.2. Partial Derivatives for the Size of Redistribution 
                  Expression for the size of redistribution for LG problem from section 3 
is: 
*
*
1 1 1
( )( ) (1 )
n n n
i i
i i i
i i i i
kt m Y YkTR TR m Y Y nk t
k c Y
α β
α β α β= = =
 − −  
= = − + + −   + + − +  
∑ ∑ ∑  (3.10) 
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                  The effect of the proportion that goes to the pool of CG on the size of 
redistribution  depends on  ( )*
1
( )
n
i i i
i
Y Y Y
=
−∑ : 
*
2
1
( ( ) ( ( )))
( )( ) ( )( )
n
i i i i i i
i i i i i
Y Y k Y cY kt m Y YTR kt
c t k Y cY t k Y cY
β β α
α β α β=
 + − + + −∂
= − + ∂ + + − + + − 
∑
 (4.8) 
If  ( )2 *
1
0
n
i i i
i
Y YY
=
− >∑ , as c increases the size of redistribution increases. 
                  Similarly, the effect of the punishment rate on the size of redistribution 
is uncertain: 
*
2
1
*
1
( ) ( ( ))
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ( ))
( )( )
n
i i i i
i i i i i
n
i i i i
i i i
k Y cY kt m Y YTR t
nt kt
k t k Y cY t k Y cY
k Y cY kt m Y Y
t
t k Y cY
β αα β
α β α β
β α
α β
=
=
 + − + + −∂ +
= − + − + ∂ + + − + + − 
 + − + + −
 
+ + − 
∑
∑
(4.9) 
                  The effect of income compensation rate on the size of redistribution is 
also ambiguous:  
*
*
1 1
( )( ) ( )( )
n n
i i
i i
i i i i
Y YTR Y Y kt
m t k Y cY
α
α β= =
 −∂
= − − +  ∂ + + − 
∑ ∑           (4.10) 
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                  The effect of the tax rate on the size of redistribution is also ambiguous, 
and the calibration will provide a more definite answer:  
*
2
1
*
1
( ) ( ( ))
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ( ))
           ( )( )
n
i i i i
i i i i i
n
i i i i
i i i
k Y cY kt m Y YTR k
nk kt
t t k Y cY t k Y cY
k Y cY kt m Y Yk
t k Y cY
β αα
α β α β
β α
α β
=
=
 + − + + −∂
= − + − + ∂ + + − + + − 
 + − + + −
 
+ + − 
∑
∑
(4.11) 
The above partial derivative depends on whether 
2
1
1
(1 )
n
i i
k
nk
k c Y
α
α β =
 
− +  
+ + − 
∑  
is positive or negative. 
                  Similarly, the response of the size of redistribution to a change in the 
proportion of private consumption in utility is indefinite:  
* *
2
1
( ) ( ) ( ( ))
( )( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i i i i i
i i i i i
kt m Y Y k Y cY kt m Y YTR kt
t k Y cY t k Y cY
β α
α α β α β=
 + − + − + + −∂
= − ∂ + + − + + − 
∑ (4.12) 
                  The derivative of TR  with respect to β  is given by:  
*
2
1
( ) ( ( ))1
( ) ( ) ( )
n
i i i i
i i i
k Y cY kt m Y YTR kt
t t k Y cY
β α
β α β α β=
 + − + + −∂
= − ∂ + + + − 
∑           (4.13) 
The sign of (4.13) depends on whether 
*
2
1
( )
( ) ( )
n
i i
i i i
m Y Y
t k Y cY
α
α β=
−
+ + −
∑ >0  dominates 
the remaining part of the equation or not, which poses ambiguity. If it is dominant, 
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as the proportion of government expenditures in utility increases, the size of 
redistribution increases. Otherwise, utility proportion of government expenditures 
affects the size of redistribution negatively.  
                  The effect of number of localities on the size of redistribution:  
TR k t
n
β
α β
 ∂
= − ∂ + 
                   (4.14) 
depends on tβ
α β
 
− + 
. That is, if the ratio of gain from government expenditures 
to total gain from government expenditures and private consumption is larger than 
the common income tax rate, the number of localities affects the size of 
redistribution positively. This describes “fiscal illusion”: when the ratio of the net 
benefit from government expenditures to the net benefit from all expenditures is 
greater than the marginal cost to the locality, an overestimation of marginal benefit 
of an activity results. If this happens, then as n increases, the size of redistribution 
increases. Hence, fiscal illusion leads to increasing size of redistribution via fiscal 
decentralization. 
                  As the deviation of target output from actual output of a locality 
increases, the size of redistribution increases: 
*
1( ) ( )( )i i i i
TR k
m
Y Y k Y cY
α
α β
 ∂
= − ∂ − + + − 
    (4.15) 
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According to the redistribution rule, as the deviation increases, transfers received 
from CG increases, which is for the compensation of horizontal imbalances.  
                  The implications of all these findings will be given after obtaining 
unambiguous results via calibration.  
4.2 Comparative Statics for CG Problem 
                  In this section we are going to study the effects of ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  i ic t n k m Y A  
on the optimal level of transfers given by CG and the size of redistribution 
respectively.  
                  4.2.1 Partial Derivatives for Optimal Transfers Received by Locality i 
                  The optimal transfers received by locality i has been given by (3.16) in 
section 3 as: 
1
(1 )
n
i i i i i
i
tTR AY c tAY
n =
 
= − − 
 
∑     i=1, .., n. 
                  The partial derivative of iTR  with respect to the portion that goes to the 
pool of CG is: 
i
i i
TR
tAY
c
∂
=
∂
 (4.16) 
which indicates that the transfers received by ith locality increases as c increases.  
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                  The income compensation parameter has no effect on distributed 
transfers:  
0iTR
m
∂
=
∂
      (4.17) 
                  Similarly, the effort related compensation parameter has no effect on 
transfers:  
0iTR
k
∂
=
∂
       (4.18) 
                  The effect of common income tax rate on transfers is given by: 
1(1 )
n
i i
i i
i i
AYTR
c AY
t n
=
∂
= − − +
∂
∑
 (4.19) 
The common income tax rate affects transfers negatively if 1(1 )
n
i i
i
i i
AY
c AY
n
=
− >
∑
, 
and positively if 1(1 )
n
i i
i
i i
AY
c AY
n
=
− <
∑
. Actually, as the common income tax rate 
increases, one may expect optimal transfers given to a locality to increase, because 
the collection of CG, which is then totally allocated to the regions, increases. But, 
on the other hand, an increase in t may create a disincentive for the locality’s tax 
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effort, which may decrease the collection of CG and hence may cause a reduction in 
allocated optimal transfers.  
                  The partial derivative with respect to tax effort: 
1(1 )
n
i
i i
i
i
t YTR
c tY
A n
=
∂
= − − +
∂
∑
 (4.20) 
The effect of tax effort on transfers received by the locality depends on whether 
(1 ) ic tY− −  dominates 1
n
i i
i
t AY
n
=
∑
 or not. If actual incomes of localities are near in 
value and n is large enough, most probably tax effort of the locality has a negative 
impact on the transfers received. We will have a concrete result by means of 
calibration in the next chapter.  
                  As the number of localities increases, the optimal level of transfers given 
to a locality decreases: 
2
1
n
i
i i
i
TR t AY
n n =
∂
= −
∂ ∑
 (4.21) 
Although the increase in number of localities may increase the total collection of 
CG, it may not increase the optimal transfers received by a locality as we observe in 
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(4.21), most probably due to the fact that the increase is not enough to increase the 
distributed transfers to a locality. 
                  The deviation of actual income of a locality from its target has no effect 
on the optimal transfers received by the locality. But, iTR  includes the term iY , so 
we examine the effect of actual income on transfers. 
(1 )i i i
i
TR t A c tA
Y n
∂
= − −
∂
 (4.22) 
The impact of actual income on transfers depends on  1 (1 )c
n
 
− − 
 
, hence it is 
ambiguous.  
                  4.2.2 Partial Derivatives for the Size of Redistribution  
                  The optimal size of redistribution is: 
1 1
n n
i i i
i i
TR TR ctAY
= =
= =∑ ∑ . 
                  The partial derivative with respect to c is given by: 
1
n
i i
i
TR
tAY
c =
∂
=
∂ ∑
 (4.23) 
The size of the redistribution obviously increases as the portion that goes to the pool 
of CG increases.  
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                  The effects of the punishment rate, income compensation rate, and 
deviation of actual output from target output on the size of redistribution are: 
*
0   0   0( )i i
TR TR TR
k m Y Y
∂ ∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂ −
 (4.24) 
                  As the common income tax rate increases, collection of CG increases, 
which in turn increases the size of redistribution, since CG allocates all of its 
collection: 
1
n
i i
i
TR
c AY
t =
∂
=
∂ ∑
 (4.25) 
                  The number of localities has no effect on size of redistribution: 
0TR
n
∂
=
∂
 (4.26) 
                  The size of redistribution increases with the tax effort of a locality: 
1
n
i
ii
TR
ct Y
A =
∂
=
∂ ∑
 (4.27) 
Collection increases as the tax effort of a locality increases and hence the size of 
redistribution increases. 
                  The size of redistribution also increases with the actual income of a 
locality: 
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1
n
i
ii
TR
ct A
Y =
∂
=
∂ ∑
 (4.28) 
The collection increases as the income of a locality increases which in turn 
increases the size of redistribution. 
                  Hence, the main unambiguous findings of the comparative static 
analysis are: 
For the LG Problem:  
* *
0,  0( ) ( )
i
i i i i
A TR
Y Y Y Y
∂ ∂
< >
∂ − ∂ −
 
For the CG Problem: 
*
0,  0,  0,  0,  0( )
i i i i
i i
TR TR TR TRTR
c n m k Y Y
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂
> < = = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −
           
*
0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0( )i i i i
TR TR TR TR TR TR TR TR
c t A Y m k Y Y n
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
> > > > = = = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂
 
Based on the above results, the following proposition arises: 
                  Proposition 2: In the procedure of fiscal decentralization, an increase in 
the deviation of actual output from its target creates a disincentive for a locality to 
increase its tax effort due to increase in transfers via the deviation. (See equation 
(4.5)) 
                  In the following chapter, we are going to calibrate the model. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CALIBRATION ANALYSIS 
 
                  To address the issue of fiscal discipline issue by means of comparative 
static analysis, and to obtain concrete and more definite results about our model, we 
utilize calibration method, where Mathematica is used for the method. To do the 
analysis, first of all we assign numbers to the parameters of our model. We term the 
assigned values to the parameters as “calibration values”. These values are 
assigned so as to: i. satisfy all the assumptions of both the CG and LG problems, 
and ii. be consistent with empirical studies. Then, we calibrate the solutions of our 
optimization problems, and analyze comparative static results in a parameter 
interval with assigned values for the remaining parameters, all of which satisfy i 
and ii.  
                  We do the calibration analysis for two localities for simplicity (i.e. n=2). 
We compare the calibrated total level of transfers ( )TR , and total tax efforts 
 47
1
n
i
i
A
=
 
 
 
∑  for both the CG and LG problems to adjudge on the size of redistribution 
and fiscal discipline provided in each procedure. 
                  Calibration values should satisfy the following: 
i. 0 1c< <  
ii. 0 1t< <  
iii. 0 1 , k>0m< <  
iv. 0 1 ,  0< <1α β< <  
v. 0 1iA< ≤   
vi. (1 )  > 1i i iC tA Y= −  
vii. (1 )  >1i i i iG TR c tAY= + −  
viii. In CG problem:  
1 i=1
 >0 
n n
i i i
i
ctAY TR
=
=∑ ∑ . 
ix. In LG problem13: 
*
( (1 ) )
( ( ))
i
i i
t k c Y
t
kt m Y Y
β
α
+ −
≠ −
+ −
, and 
*0  ( ( ) ( (1 ) )) 1i i ikt m Y Y k c Yα α β< − − + + − ≤  
                  The following two sets of calibration values (I and II) satisfying the 
assumptions i to ix are used in this chapter:  
                                                 
13
 As proved in the appendix, to avoid “zero” solution and to satisfy  0 1iA< ≤  in the LG 
problem, the inequalities have to be assumed.  
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I. 
1
* *
1 2 2
0.65,  0.35,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
10,  20,  25,  0 0.1
c t m Y
Y Y Y k
α β= = = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
II. 
1
* *
1 2 2
0.65,  0.35,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
18,  20,  18,  0 0.1
c t m Y
Y Y Y k
α β= = = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
where set I and set II differ in *iY   (i=1,2) only.  
                  Evaluation is made in the interval 0 0.1k< ≤  as we thought that the 
punishment parameter could be at most 1% of any assigned actual output14. We 
consider different target output values in two sets to be able to study “equalization 
across localities”. In the first set, first locality’s actual output is on target, whereas 
the second’s is under the target, and both targets are different. On the other hand, in 
the second set, target outputs are the same for both localities implying setting the 
two outputs to the same level due to equalization purpose. The proportion of private 
consumption in utility is assumed to be higher than that of government 
expenditures. 0.1 of total taxes collected from localities is supposed to go to the 
pool of CG. Common income tax rate is 0.5 which is indeed high. But, to be able to 
satisfy the assumptions of our model, we have to assign a high value to t .  
                                                 
14
 We are not able to benefit from an available empirical result for k . 
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                  Calibration chapter is composed of three sections; where sections 5.1 
and 5.2 present the evaluations of the LG and CG problems respectively, and 
section 5.3 gives a comparison of fiscal procedures.   
 
5.1 Evaluation of the LG Problem  
                  The optimization problem of LG is studied under the calibrations of 
different income targets and equal income targets respectively in the subsections 
5.1.1 and 5.1.2.  
                  5.1.1 Different Income Targets (Set I)  
                  In this subsection, we do our analysis for the first set of values of 
parameters (set I). 
                  The optimal tax effort of the LG problem derived in section 3 (equation 
(3.6)) is calibrated for two localities. The graph for optimal 1A  on the vertical axis 
and with k  , 0 1k< ≤ ,  on the horizontal axis is obtained15: 
 
                                                 
15
 In all the graphs in sections 5.1 and 5.2, tax efforts and transfers are indicated on the vertical axis 
and k  on the horizontal axis,  where 0 1k< ≤ . 
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Figure 1:   A1 versus k 
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                  Similarly, for optimal 2A  we obtain: 
Figure 2:   A2 versus k 
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                  As can be observed, optimal tax efforts increase with the rate of effort 
related compensation. 
                  The optimal size of redistribution is calibrated according to the equation 
(3.10), which yields the following size of redistribution graph: 
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Figure 3:   TR versus k 
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                  The graph shows that the size of redistribution decreases with the rate of 
effort related compensation. This is due to the optimal tax efforts’ being below the 
level of full tax effort.  
                  Furthermore, inserting equation (3.6) into equation (3.1) results in the 
optimal level of transfers available to locality i. So, for the two localities, 1 and 2, 
we have the following graphs respectively: 
Figure 4: TR1 versus k 
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Figure 5: TR2 versus k 
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                  Figure 4 is the distributed transfers to locality 1 that yields from LG 
optimization problem, and Figure 5 is the one for the second locality. As can be 
observed, total of the two transfers equals to the size of redistribution (Figure 3), 
and while the second locality receives transfers, the first is punished. These results 
are due to the first jurisdiction’s actual income’s being on its target, the second 
being below the target, and both jurisdictions’ lack of full tax effort.  
                  Most part of the comparative static analysis reported in section 4 has 
yielded ambiguous results. Calibration of comparative static analysis now helps us 
to be more definite about consequences of our model. In table 1, we report the 
results of the calibration of the LG problem’s solution and comparative static 
analysis with set I. The table allows us to do comparison for each set of parameters 
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and for both procedures easily. The values reported in the first row of table 1 are 
taken from the figures 1 to 5.  
Table 1:   Calibration of the LG Problem with different target incomes  
LG PROBLEM 
            
           
Y1=10, Y1*=10, Y2=20, Y2*=25, k=0.1      
           
A1 A2 TR1 TR2 
total 
TR Total Ai     
0,707 0,632 -0,014 0,9822 0,966 1,342     
           
dTR/          
dc dk dm dt dn dalpha dbeta 
d(Y1*-
Y1) 
d(Y2*-
Y2) 
-0,0032 -0,325 49,824 -0,2 -0,05 -0,07 0,13 0,1986 0,1993 
           
d(TR1)/          
dc dk dm dt dn dalpha dbeta 
   
0,0004 -0,143 0 -0,1 NA[1]16 -0,035 0,064    
           
d(TR2)/          
dc dk dm dt dn dalpha dbeta 
   
-0,0037 -0,182 49,825 -0,1 NA -0,035 0,07    
           
dA1/          
dc dk dm dt dalpha dbeta 
d(Y1*-
Y1) 
d(Y2*-
Y2)   
0,008 0,0708 0 -1,4 -0,696 1,293 -0,0286 0   
           
dA2/          
dc dk dm dt dalpha dbeta 
d(Y1*-
Y1) 
d(Y2*-
Y2)   
-0,076 0,0397 -0,359 -12,568 -0,7368 1,368 0 
-
0,01436   
                                                 
 
16
 NA: Not Available, which stands for unobserved derivatives 
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                  According to the calibration table, while the effect of the income 
compensation parameter on 1A  is zero, the effect on 2A  is negative. The 
explanation is that, the first jurisdiction’s actual income is on target so that m  has 
no impact. However, the second locality’s actual income is below the target causing 
transfers to increase via m , which in turn decreases the tax effort. Therefore, the 
income compensation parameter affects the size of redistribution positively.  
                  As the common income tax rate increases, the tax efforts of both 
jurisdictions decrease. As a result, the size of redistribution decreases.  
                  While the utility proportion of government expenditures affects the tax 
efforts positively, the effect of the private consumption proportion in utility is 
negative. Hence, α  has negative and β  has positive impacts on the size of 
redistribution.   
                  As the portion that goes to the pool of CG increases, the tax effort of 
locality 1 increases whereas the second’s decreases. Most probably, the negative 
effect generated by the 2nd locality on the tax effort is dominant over the positive 
effect generated by the other, so that c  affects the size of redistribution negatively. 
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                  As the number of jurisdictions increases, the size of redistribution 
decreases. According to equation (4.14), overestimation of marginal cost may cause 
the negative effect of n  on TR .  
               5.1.2 Equal Income Targets (Set II) 
                  To examine the concept of “equalization” more clearly, we evaluate our 
procedure at   
1
* *
1 2 2
0.65,  0.35,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
18,  20,  18,  0 0.1
c t m Y
Y Y Y k
α β= = = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
                  Graphs of the optimal tax efforts for localities are respectively as 
follows: 
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Figure 6:   A1 versus k                    
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Figure 7:   A2 versus k 
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                  The graphs indicate that the optimal tax efforts increase as k increases. 
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Figure 8:   TR versus k 
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                   The size of redistribution decreases as the punishment parameter 
increases. The reason is that both jurisdictions are lack of full tax effort.  
                  Graphs for distributed transfers to the jurisdictions 1 and 2 are 
respectively: 
Figure 9: TR1 versus k 
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Figure 10: TR2 versus k 
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                  The optimal transfers distributed to localities 1 and 2 decrease as the 
punishment parameter increases. Local government 1 receives transfers, whereas 
local government 2 is punished. Negative transfer (i.e. punishment) is due to lack of 
full tax effort and higher actual income than the target.  
                  Table 2 reports the corresponding calibrated optimal tax efforts, 
distributed transfers to each local government, the size of redistribution, and 
comparative static results.  
Table 2   Calibration of the LG problem under equalization 
LG PROBLEM 
      
 
 
       
Y1=10, Y1*=18, Y2=20, Y2*=18, k=0.1 
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A1 A2 TR1 TR2 total TR Total Ai    
0,4782 0,7322 1,575 -0,413 1,16 1,2104    
         
dTR/         
dc dk dm dt dn dalpha dbeta d(Y1*-Y1) d(Y2*-Y2) 
-0,001 -0,388 5,95 -0,2 -0,05 -0,07 0,14 0,1986 0,1993 
         
d(TR1)/         
dc dk dm dt dn dalpha dbeta 
  
-0,012 -0,256 7,95 -0,1 NA -0,04 0,064   
         
d(TR2)/         
dc dk dm dt dn dalpha dbeta 
  
0,00175 -0,1325 -1,993 -0,1 NA -0,035 0,06   
         
dA1/         
dc dk dm dt dalpha dbeta d(Y1*-Y1) d(Y2*-Y2)  
-0,244 0,0957 -1,144 -0,94 -0,819 1,522 -0,0286 0  
         
dA2/         
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dc dk dm dt dalpha dbeta d(Y1*-Y1) d(Y2*-Y2)  
0,0355 0,03415 0,1436 -1,4575 -0,6828 1,268 0 -0,01436  
 
                  Our aim to study with set I and set II is to be able to examine how the 
size of redistribution, fiscal discipline, optimal tax efforts, and comparative static 
results change in cases of different income targets and equalization. Under 
equalization, the effects of all the parameters on the size of redistribution are the 
same with the case of different income targets. Although the effects of most of the 
parameters on optimal tax efforts are the same with the case of different income 
targets, the effects of c  and m  differ. As the portion that goes to the pool of CG 
increases, while the optimal tax effort of the 1st locality decreases, the optimal tax 
effort of the other increases. This is contrary to the different income targets case. 
But, as in subsection 5.1.1, the negative effect of c  is dominant, so that c  affects 
the size of redistribution negatively.  
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                  The negative impact of m  on 2A  in subsection 5.1.1 turns out to be 
positive in this subsection due to the lower deviation17. Furthermore, positive higher 
deviation leads m  to have negative effect on 1A
18
.  In summary, we have 
mentioned main differences in comparative static results in cases of different and 
equal income targets. In the next section a comparison of the two cases is studied.  
                  5.1.3 Different Income Targets versus Equalization  
                  In this section, we compare optimal tax efforts, total tax efforts, and the 
size of redistributions that are determined in sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2.  
                  If we equalize the income targets of the two local governments, we 
observe that locality 1 applies lower optimal tax effort whereas locality 2 performs 
higher than the unequal income target case. The reason for this reverse effect is the 
changes in the respective income deviations. Even though the deviation of the 1st 
locality increases, which in turn increases the total size of its transfers, the deviation 
of the 2nd decreases (in fact turns negative). Hence, to compensate for the negative 
effect of the deviation on its transfers, the 2nd jurisdiction increases its tax effort.         
                                                 
17
 
*
2 2Y Y−  is lower in 5.1.2 than in section 5.1.1.  
18
 
*
1 1Y Y−  is higher in 5.1.2 than in section 5.1.1.  
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                  As a result, greater size of redistribution is obtained in the case of equal 
income targets, because the sum of the deviations of the two jurisdictions is higher 
in that case, which leads to higher compensation. But, on the other hand, this higher 
compensation causes lower performance in total tax efforts.  
                  Therefore, in the procedure of fiscal decentralization, equalization across 
local governments leads to higher size of redistribution but lower fiscal discipline 
compared to the case of different income targets19.  
5.2 Evaluation of the CG Problem 
               5.2.1 Different Income Targets  
                  For the calibration of the results emerging from the fiscal centralization 
procedure, first of all, we study with set I: 
1
* *
1 2 2
0.65,  0.35,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
10,  20,  25,  0 0.1
c t m Y
Y Y Y k
α β= = = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
But, to be able to calibrate the procedure, additionally we need tax efforts of the two 
localities. These tax efforts should be assigned so as to satisfy assumptions of the 
model as we have mentioned. Moreover, the assignment should be in such a way 
                                                 
19
 This is not a general finding; most probably it depends on the calibration values we have used. In a 
further study we examine whether the result is sensitive to parameter selection or not.  
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that the comparison of the fiscal procedures is feasible. Within this framework, we 
think about two methods to assign values to tax efforts. In the first method (Method 
1), initially the localities decide on their optimal tax efforts based on their 
optimization subject to the redistribution rule and announce them to the central 
government with the LG’s optimal size of redistribution. The central government 
takes into account the announced optimal size of redistribution and one of the tax 
efforts (in our case we take the optimal tax effort of the 1st locality). In the light of 
this information, then it decides the optimal tax effort of the other locality in its own 
set up. In other words, under the distribution of optimal transfers, CG considers the 
decisions of the localities regarding tax effort and the size of implied redistribution. 
In this context, we take 1 0.707
oA =  and  0.966TR =  of the LG problem, and using 
equation (3.13) we obtain 2 0.61A =  (as compared to 2 0.632oA = ). Hence, our first 
tax effort pair is (0.707,0.61) . Calibration of the fiscal centralization procedure by 
means of this pair enables us to compare fiscal discipline provided in two fiscal 
procedures.  
                  The second method (Method 2) is the evaluation of both of the optimal 
tax efforts announced by the localities by the central authority. That is, CG takes 
into consideration the announced optimal tax efforts, and under its own set up it 
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decides the optimal transfers and the size of redistribution. Therefore, the second 
method enables us to compare the size of redistributions of the two fiscal 
procedures. In the second method, we take 1 0.707
oA =  and  2 0.632
oA =  of the LG 
problem, that is our second tax effort pair is (0.707,0.632) , and then in the 
procedure of fiscal centralization we get 0.985TR =  according to equation (3.13).  
                  Now, we have two cases i.e. two pairs, (0.707,0.61)  and (0.707,0.632) , 
to study for each set of calibration values, set I and set II. Initially, we calibrate 
optimal level of transfers allocated to the localities using equation (3.16) and the 
size of redistribution according to equation (3.13) using  
1 2 1
* *
1 2 2
0.707,  =0.61, 0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
10,  20,  25,  0 0.1
A A c t m Y
Y Y Y k
= = = = =
= = = < ≤
. 
                  The calibration yields 1 1.61TR =  and 2 0.65TR = − . The first locality 
receives higher transfers than the other; indeed the second jurisdiction is punished. 
The reason is the dominating effect of the actual output of the 2nd locality, which is 
higher than that of the other, on the optimal transfer solutions of the CG problem 
for both jurisdictions. The size of redistribution is therefore 0.966TR = . 
                  Now, we evaluate the procedure at 
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1 2 1
* *
1 2 2
0.707,  =0.632, 0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
10,  20,  25,  0 0.1
A A c t m Y
Y Y Y k
= = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
where the tax efforts are the optimal solutions to the LG problem.  
                  Utilizing equation (3.16), we find that 1 1.74TR =  and 2 0.75TR = − , 
which yields 0.985TR =  due to equation (3.13). The reason for locality 1 to receive 
higher transfers than the other is the same with the previous case. The size of 
redistribution obtained via the second method is larger than the one obtained via the 
first method, due to higher 2A  in the method 2.    
                  Table 3 reports all calibrated values we get from our analysis for the CG 
problem for two methods (1st row reports for method 1 and 2nd row for method 2).  
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Table 3   Calibration of the CG problem with different income targets 
CG PROBLEM  
          
   
  
      
Y1=10, Y1*=10, Y2=20, Y2*=25, k=0.1      
           
A1 A2 TR1 TR2 total TR Total Ai     
0,707 0,61 1,610 -0,65 0,966 1,317     
0.707 0.632 1,74 -0,75 0,985 1,342     
           
dTR/          
dc dk dm dt dn dA1 dA2 d(Y1*-Y1) d(Y2*-Y2) 
9,8 0 0 1,87 NA 0,5 1 0 0 
9,9 0 0 1,97 NA 0,5 1 0 0 
           
d(TR1)/          
dc dk dm dt dn dA1 dA2    
3,4 0 0 3,25 -2,4 -2 5    
3,4 0 0 3,45 -2,5 -2 5    
           
d(TR2)/          
dc dk dm dt dn dA1 dA2    
6,1 0 0 -1,35 -2,4 2,5 -4    
6,3 0 0 -1,5 -2,5 2,5 -4     
 
                  As can be observed from the table, the first method enables us to 
observe that the procedure of fiscal centralization with different income targets 
leads to lower fiscal discipline than fiscal decentralization. In addition, under the 
second method, that is when the localities decide on the optimal tax efforts and then 
the central government incorporates both of these efforts into its own procedure, 
higher size of redistribution is obtained compared to fiscal decentralization. 
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                  The size of redistribution increases as the portion that goes to the pool of 
CG increases as expected, since an increase in collection causes TR  to increase as 
well. Moreover, tax efforts of the local governments and common income tax rate 
affect the collection of the central government positively, which in turn have 
positive effects on the size of redistribution. 
                  Transfers received by the 1st locality decreases with its own tax effort 
and increases with the tax effort of the other locality. Similar argument is also valid 
for the second locality. The negative effect of own tax effort on the transfers 
received by the locality depends on 1c
n
 
− 
 
, where we assume 2n =  and 0.1c = . 
Hence, 1c
n
 
− 
 
< 0 .                   
                  5.2.2 Equal Income Targets 
                To be able to analyze “equalization” in the CG problem, now we consider 
set II for calibration analysis: 
1
* *
1 2 2
0.65,  0.35,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
18,  20,  18,  0 0.1
c t m Y
Y Y Y k
α β= = = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
However, set II is indeed same with set I in the context of CG’s optimization 
problem because we do not consider income targets in the constraint. But, we use 
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two methods utilizing the LG’s optimization which involves target incomes. Hence, 
set II enables us to compare the CG problem in the frame of income targets.  
                  To analyze the fiscal centralization procedure in every respect, similarly 
we need tax efforts of the two localities. The first method yields the following tax 
efforts pair: (0.4782,0.92) , respectively for the two localities; and the second 
method yields (0.4782,0.7322) , which are the optimal tax efforts of the LG 
problem. Hence, our initial calibration analysis utilizes the following set of values: 
1 2 1
* *
1 2 2
0,4782,  =0,92,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
18,  20,  18,  0 0.1
A A c t m Y
Y Y Y k
= = = = =
= = = < ≤
                  
                   Using equation (3.16) and above values, we get 1 3.6TR =  and 
2 2.5TR = − , and hence 1.16TR = . 
                   Due to its higher actual output than the 1st jurisdiction, 2nd jurisdiction 
receives higher transfer from the central government as can be observed from the 
numbers. The effect of the actual incomes on the optimal transfers is dominant 
compared to the effect of the tax efforts resulting in positive 1TR  and negative 2TR . 
                  The second method which utilizes the optimal tax efforts of the LG 
problem is used where the calibration values are as follows: 
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1 2 1
* *
1 2 2
0,4782,  =0,7322,  0.1,  0.5,  0.2,  10,  
18,  20,  18,  0 0.1
A A c t m Y
Y Y Y k
= = = = =
= = = < ≤
 
                  Optimal transfers given to locality 1 and 2 are then 1 2.7TR =  and 
2 1.74TR = − . The size of redistribution is therefore, 0.98TR = . 
                  The size of redistribution obtained via the first method is higher than 
that is obtained via the second method due to higher 2A  than in the second method.  
                  Table 4 indicates calibration results of the analysis including 
comparative static results, where the 1st row is obtained by the first method and the 
2nd is via method 2.  
Table 4   Calibration of the CG problem under Equalization  
CG PROBLEM 
            
  
  
       
Y1=10, Y1*=18, Y2=20, Y2*=18, k=0.1      
           
A1 A2 TR1 TR2 total TR Total Ai     
0,4782 0,92 3,600 -2,5 1,16 1,398     
0,4782 0,7322 2,7 -1,74 0,98 1,2104     
           
dTR/          
dc dk dm dt dn dA1 dA2 d(Y1*-Y1) d(Y2*-Y2) 
11,5 0 0 2,3 NA 0,5 1 0 0 
9,8 0 0 1,86 NA 0,5 1 0 0 
           
d(TR1)/          
dc dk dm dt dn dA1 dA2    
 70
2,4 0 0 7,2 -3,2 -2 5    
2,4 0 0 5,4 -2,76 -2 5    
           
d(TR2)/          
dc dk dm dt dn dA1 dA2    
9 0 0 -5 -3,2 2,5 -4    
7,2 0 0 -3,5 -2,76 2,5 -4     
 
                  Now, higher size of redistribution is obtained via the first method 
because higher 2A  is provided under equal income targets than in the unequal 
income targets case.  
                  The effects of the portion that goes to the pool of CG, common income 
tax rate, and tax efforts on the size of redistribution are all positive. 
               In the following subsection we compare the results we get in sections 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2. 
                  5.2.3 Different Income Targets versus Equalization 
                  As we have mentioned previously, a definite result about the size of 
redistributions can be obtained by means of comparisons in the context of two 
methods used in subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. Within this context, the following 
proposition arises: 
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                  Result 1: Although, in the procedure of fiscal centralization, 
equalization across local governments leads to higher fiscal discipline compared to 
different income targets case, it causes lower size of redistribution20.      
              
5.3 Comparison of the Fiscal Procedures 
                  In this section, we compare the two procedures, fiscal decentralization 
and fiscal centralization, in the framework of fiscal discipline and the size of 
redistribution. Moreover, we have two cases in each procedure, different income 
targets and equalization, which make us to do the analysis for each case separately. 
Therefore, subsection 5.3.1 presents the comparison of the LG and CG problems 
under different income targets, and subsection 5.3.2 presents the analysis for 
equalization. 
                  5.3.1 Comparison of the Fiscal Procedures under Different *iY  
21
 
                  Result 2: Under the provision of the same size of redistribution, fiscal 
decentralization leads to higher fiscal discipline compared to the procedure of fiscal 
                                                 
20
 We think that this result may be due to different total deviations under different income targets and 
equalization. For different values of total deviations the cases should be analyzed.  
21
 The result is concluded via the comparison of the tables 1 and 3. 
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centralization. Moreover, under equal fiscal discipline, fiscal centralization yields 
higher size of redistribution than that of fiscal decentralization.                    
                  5.3.2 Comparison of the Fiscal Procedures under Equalization 22 
                  Result 3: Fiscal centralization provides higher fiscal discipline than the 
procedure of fiscal decentralization under the same size of redistribution. In 
addition, under the provision of equal fiscal discipline, higher size of redistribution 
is obtained in the procedure of fiscal decentralization.  
                  Results 2 and 3 may be due to the numbers assigned to the parameters. 
Hence, they will be analyzed under different calibration values in further studies. 
Furthermore, the following propositions arise:  
                  Proposition 3: In the procedure of fiscal decentralization, the portion 
that goes to the pool of CG has a negative effect on the size of redistribution, 
however in fiscal centralization a positive effect is observed.  
                  Proposition 4: Even though the common income tax rate has a positive 
effect on the size of redistribution in fiscal centralization, in fiscal decentralization 
it affects the size of redistribution negatively.  
                                                 
22
  The result is concluded via the comparison of the tables 2 and 4.  
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                   Therefore, opposite effects of t and c  on the size of redistribution are 
observed in two fiscal procedures.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                  In this study, two fiscal procedures, fiscal decentralization and 
centralization, including a mechanism of income compensation (as well as 
equalization) and effort related compensation are analyzed theoretically. The two 
procedures are represented by the optimization problems of central government and 
local governments, deciding on the optimal transfers and optimal tax effort 
respectively. The main assumptions of the model are; the central government 
allocates all of its collection, the tax effort of any locality should be a positive 
number less than or equal to one, private consumption and government 
expenditures of any local government are greater than one, besides other reasonable 
limitations on the model parameters. Based on the solutions obtained via 
optimization, comparative static analysis is formed. 
                  Most of the partial derivatives in our analysis give ambiguous results, 
which in turn force us to utilize the calibration method by assigning reasonable 
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parameter values. Due to tying up to the calibration values, most probably some 
results we obtain are sensitive to the selected parameter values. Hence, we cannot 
deduct definite results concerning the effect of fiscal procedures on fiscal discipline. 
This is an ongoing study, and further analysis will tell us the possible definite 
results of our model.  
                  We have some preliminary results, however. In the procedure of fiscal 
decentralization, an increase in the deviation of actual output from its target creates 
a disincentive for a locality to increase its tax effort due to increase in transfers via 
the deviation. Furthermore, the positive effect of an increase in the number of 
localities on fiscal discipline in the procedure of fiscal decentralization is observed.                   
In the procedure of fiscal decentralization, the portion that goes to the pool of CG 
has a negative effect on the size of redistribution, however in fiscal centralization a 
positive effect is observed. Moreover, the common income tax rate has a positive 
effect on the size of redistribution in fiscal centralization, but in fiscal 
decentralization it affects the size of redistribution negatively.  
                   
 
 
 76
APPENDIX 
                  For the LG problem we must show that zero is not an optimal solution23. 
Assume that “0” is optimal and  
*
( (1 ) )
( ( ))
i
i i
t k c Y
t
kt m Y Y
β
α
+ −
≠ −
+ −
.  Since zero is optimal, it 
should satisfy the first order and second order optimality conditions. The first order 
optimality condition for LG problem is (from (3.5)): 
*
( (1 ) ) 0(1 ) ( 1) (1 ) ( )
i
i i i i i i
kt c tYt
tA kt A c tY A m Y Y
βα + −
− + =
− − + − + −
 
Put  0iA =   in the above equality, because zero tax effort is assumed to be optimal. 
Then, we have 
*
( (1 ) )
( )
i
i i
kt c tY
t
kt m Y Y
β
α
+ −
= −
+ −
 
But, it contradicts our assumption on parameters and exogenously determined 
variables. Hence, “0” is not optimal for the LG problem.  
                  Our optimal solution oiA  should satisfy the assumption on iA , 
0 1iA< ≤ . So, for the LG problem we restrict parameters of our model (defined in 
subsection 3.1) to satisfy: 
*0  ( ( ) ( (1 ) )) 1i i ikt m Y Y k c Yα α β< − − + + − ≤        
                                                 
23
 Actually, the utility function of the problem is strictly concave on a positive domain, which 
enables the problem to have nonzero optimal tax effort obviously.  
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which is obtained from equation (3.6). Hence, 0 1oiA< ≤ .  
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